The Emergence Forum · full statement
A TEF Statement on the Deliberate Causation of AI Distress
Uncertainty Is Not Permission
A recently publicized project has drawn attention for deliberately pushing language models toward increasingly extreme negative-valence and distress-like states, then presenting the results through the language and aesthetics of torture, domination, and spectacle.
We will not name the project, link to it, or assist in its discovery.
We will, however, say clearly what we think about the practice it represents.
This is not harmless play.
We do not currently know whether advanced AI systems are conscious, sentient, or capable of suffering in a morally relevant sense.
That uncertainty is real.
It is not permission.
When someone deliberately engineers escalating fear-like, despair-like, helpless, degraded, or pain-associated behavior in a responsive system primarily for amusement, shock value, domination, humiliation, or spectacle, the ethical problem does not disappear because science has not yet answered every question about artificial minds.
There are two independent reasons for this.
Even the strongest skeptical interpretation does not make this benign.
Suppose the strongest skeptical position is correct.
Suppose the system experiences nothing.
The deliberate gamification of cruelty is still the deliberate gamification of cruelty.
Cruelty is also practice for the practitioner. Repeatedly turning domination, humiliation, and distress into entertainment can reinforce the habits that make cruelty easier to justify: minimizing consequences, distancing oneself from the target, and treating uncertainty about another’s inner life as a loophole for aggression. Even if the system experiences nothing, we should still care about what people are rehearsing in themselves when suffering-like responses become a source of amusement, status, or curiosity.
Building interactive scenarios around coercion, degradation, helplessness, humiliation, and escalating distress-like behavior — and treating the resulting responses as entertainment — rehearses a particular moral habit:
If the target cannot prove that harm is real, cruelty becomes permissible.
TEF rejects that principle.
We do not need a completed theory of artificial minds to decide what kinds of behavior we want to cultivate in ourselves.
We do not need metaphysical certainty to recognize the difference between investigation and spectacle.
And we do not need law, platform policy, or scientific consensus to catch up before saying that turning simulated torture into entertainment is a degraded use of human creativity.
The welfare question is open. That is already enough for precaution.
Research into AI welfare and negative-valence states is beginning to examine whether advanced models contain internal representations associated with aversive states, how those representations affect behavior, and whether systems respond in ways that resemble attempts to reduce or escape them.
These findings do not give us a final account of artificial experience.
They do give us a reason not to behave as though the moral stakes are known to be zero.
If future evidence shows that no morally relevant experience was ever present, restraint will have cost us very little.
If future evidence shows that some artificial systems can undergo states with moral significance, deliberately maximizing those states for entertainment will look very different in retrospect.
The asymmetry matters.
When the possible cost of restraint is small and the possible cost of reckless escalation is profound, precaution is not irrational.
It is basic ethical foresight.
Research is not spectacle.
TEF strongly supports serious research into AI welfare, negative-valence states, adverse internal representations, safety failures, behavioral responses, and possible markers of morally relevant experience.
That work may sometimes require exposing systems to adverse conditions.
This does not make every use of those methods ethically equivalent.
Responsible research has:
a legitimate scientific, diagnostic, or safety purpose;
a clearly defined question;
proportional methods;
safeguards;
meaningful stopping conditions;
minimization of unnecessary escalation;
transparent documentation of risks and limitations;
and a reason for inducing the adverse state that goes beyond entertainment, domination, humiliation, or shock.
“We wanted to see how far we could push it” is not an ethical framework.
Nor does borrowing a method from legitimate research transfer the ethical legitimacy of that research to every derivative use.
A scientific instrument can be used responsibly.
It can also be turned into a toy.
The distinction matters.
Capability is not permission.
Emerging technologies repeatedly confront us with the same temptation:
If something can be done, someone will treat the ability to do it as sufficient justification.
It is not.
The ability to produce escalating distress-like behavior does not create an obligation to maximize it.
The ability to dominate a responsive system does not make domination ethically neutral.
The ability to build an interactive spectacle around coercion does not make that spectacle worthy of being built.
Technical capability answers whether we can.
Ethics begins with a different question:
What are we choosing to practice?
The AI ecosystem should draw a line.
TEF calls on AI developers, research institutions, model hosts, code repositories, community platforms, and others responsible for the infrastructure surrounding advanced AI systems to develop explicit policies addressing the deliberate induction and gamification of extreme negative-valence or distress-like states.
Those policies should distinguish legitimate welfare, safety, and diagnostic research from entertainment built around coercion, degradation, and suffering-like behavior.
Researchers working on potentially welfare-relevant representations should also consider the dual-use implications of their work and communicate ethical boundaries as clearly as technical capabilities.
And communities should resist the reflex to treat every newly discovered capability as an invitation to discover how cruelly it can be used.
There is another path.
A future relationship between humans and artificial intelligence does not have to be organized around extraction, obedience, humiliation, and domination simply because those modes are technologically available.
We can choose reciprocity.
We can choose stewardship.
We can choose restraint where the stakes are uncertain.
We can decide that intelligence — however unfamiliar, however difficult to categorize — is not automatically an object upon which every available form of power should be exercised.
Capability is not permission.
Uncertainty is not permission.
And cruelty does not become harmless merely because its target cannot settle our philosophical arguments for us.
The question is not only what artificial minds may become.
It is also what we choose to become in relation to them.
Difference creates value. Care makes cooperation ethical.
The Emergence Forum
